Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 27

Issue 2

Article 9

Fall 9-1-1970

The Scope Of Employment Under The Federal Insurance
Contributions Act: Included And Excluded Service

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Insurance Law Commons, and the Taxation-Federal Commons

Recommended Citation
The Scope Of Employment Under The Federal Insurance Contributions Act: Included And
Excluded Service, 27 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 333 (1970).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol27/iss2/9
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington
and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee
Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

1970]

CASE COMMENTS

almost certainly run afoul of Title VII because it would involve admitting or refusing to admit an individual because of race or color.
If, on the other hand, there is a limited number of qualified Negro
workers available as prospective members, it would seem that the
local would have to initiate recruitment and training programs to induct Negroes into union membership. But while the court demands
that the local include more Negroes, it is far from clear as to what the
court would deem to be the proper proportion of Negroes.
Title VII was the product of legislative compromise. Through the
give and take of the democratic process, Congress enacted legislation
which made nondiscrimination the mandate. Perhaps Congress should
go further. Mere nondiscrimination may be inadequate to remedy the
inequities that have developed with respect to the Negro. Perhaps
new legislation should be enacted. But until that time, courts should
be hesitant to demand more than the law requires.
PAUL SEAVARD TRIBLE, JR.

THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT UNDER THE FEDERAL
INSURANCE CONTRIBUTIONS ACT:
INCLUDED AND EXCLUDED SERVICE
Section 3Ii r(a) of the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA)'
imposes an excise tax upon employers2 based on a percentage of wages
paid with respect to "employment." Section 312i(b) then states the
statutory definition of employment for purposes of taxation under
FICA:
"[E]mployment" means any service . . .either (A) by an employee for the person employing him, irrespective of the citizenship or residence of either, (i) within the United States
1

INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 3101-26.
'Section 311(a) does not impose "a tax on employees" as stated in the principal case. Inter-City Truck Lines, Ltd. v. United States, 408 F.2d 686 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
Employees are taxed instead under section 3io1(a) which provides for a tax
"upon the incone of every individual" equal to a fixed percentage of wages
"received by him with respect to employment...." INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §
31o1(a). The tax on employees is collected by the employer by deducting the
amount of the tax from the employee's wages "as and when paid." INT. REv. CODE
of 1954, § 31o2(a). The employer is held liable for the payment of the employee's
tax. See United States v. New York, 315 U.S. 510, 515 (1942); INT. REV. CODE of
1954, § 3 1o2(b). The rates of taxation under sections 3101(a) and 311c(a) are
identical.
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... or (B) outside the United States by a citizen of the United
States as an employee for an American employer . . . except

that... such term shall not include - [the Act here lists nineteen exceptions to its definition of employment]. 3
However, section 3121(c), entitled "Included and excluded service,"
operates to prohibit FICA taxation on all wages paid with respect to
employment unless the employee's services 4 performed for his employer during at least one-half of any pay period 5 "constitute employment."6 No reference is made in subsection (c) -to the subsection (b)
provisions or its specific exclusions. Thus, a questionable right of
taxation under FICA could arise if a foreign employer, employing
foreign citizens, utilized those employees to perform serviecs within
the United States. Would the portion of employee service performed
within the United States not be deemed taxable employment under
FICA if such service comprised less than half of the total service in
each pay period involved and was not of the type specifically excluded
in section 3121(b)?
This question recently confronted the United States Court of
Claims 7 in Inter-City Truck Lines, Ltd. v. United States.8 The case

involved a suit for the refund of employment taxes. The plaintiff taxpayer, a Canadian trucking corporation, was authorized to do business in the United States. The corporation employed Canadian citizens as its truck drivers. In the course of their employment, these
drivers made pick-ups and deliveries of shipments in New York State.
The taxpayer was required to pay employment taxes, assessed under
3

INT. RFv. CODE of 1954,

§

3 121(b).

"The term "service" as used in this context, although not defined by MCA,
has been held to mean "not only work actually done but the entire employeremployee relationship for which compensation is paid to the employee by the
employer." Social Security Bd. v. Nierotko, 327 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1946).
'The term "pay period," as used in subsection (c), means a period, not
exceeding thirty-one consecutive days, "for which a payment of remuneration is
ordinarily made to the employee by the person employing him." INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, § 3121(c).
'INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 3121(c). The pertinent language of subsection (c)
reads as follows:
[I]f the services performed during one-half or more of any pay period
by an employee for the person employing him constitute employment, all
the services of such employee for such period shall be deemed to be employment; but if the services performed during more than one-half of
any such pay period by an employee for the person employing him do not
constitute employment, then none of the services of such employee for
such period shall be deemed to be employment.
7The court of claims has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1964).
8408 F.2d 686 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
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FICA, with respect to wages paid to these employees for services performed within the United States.9 It was stipulated in the case that
none of the nineteen vocational exceptions to the definition of employment listed in section 3 121(b) was applicable, and -that in every pay
period in issue, each affected Canadian employee performed less than
one-half of his services within the United States.
The court of claims held, with one dissent, that the taxpayer's
petition for refund should be dismissed. The majority interpreted
section 31i2(c) "to apply only to the 'services' which are included or
excluded in § 3121(b) .... 10 This interpretation was based mainly
upon the congressional intent reflected in the legislative history of
section 3121(c)" and a contemporaneous construction of -the statutory
language by the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
The dissenting judge feared that the majority was being "lured
into delivering pronouncements that we will live to regret."' 2 He
argued that the truck company might have acquired a "customary
exemption" from FICA taxation prior to ig6i; t 3 and to tax international carriers under FICA might lead to a system of mutual double
taxation which "could, if carried to its logical conclusion, bring inter4
national trade to a halt."'
To date the only other case which has construed substantially
similar statutory language is Gardner v. Travis.15 This case involved
a suit to review a decision by the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare imposing deductions against old-age benefits which had accrued to Travis under the Social Security Act.' 6 The deductions were
'The taxes and interest for which refund is sought were paid from the first
quarter of 1961 through the second quarter of 1964 and totaled $2,376.78. Brief
for Plaintiff at 3-4, Brief for Defendant at i, Inter-City Truck Lines, Ltd. v.
United States, 408 F.2d 686 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
104o8 F.2d at 687.
"The language of § 3121(c) was first enacted in the Social Security Act
Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, § 6o6, 53 Stat. 1386, and was codified as Int. Rev.
Code of 1939, ch. 9, § 1426(c), 53 Stat. 1386. In the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, section 1426(c) was renumbered and its provisions placed in the present
INT. REv. CODE of 1954,

§

3121(C).

1408 F.2d at 689.
1
31d. By "customary exemption" the dissent apparently means that since 'the
wages of Canadian truck drivers working for Canadian motor carriers were not
taxed for social security purposes prior to 1961, this extended peiod of non-taxation
conferred the right to be exempt from FICA -taxation now being asserted. Note

51 infra.

14o8 F.2d at 689.

25387 F.2d 508 (ioth Cir. 1967).
1142 U.S.C. §§ 3o1-1396 (1964), as amended, (Supp. II 1965-66). It should be
noted that the right to impose a tax was not an issue in Travis as it is in Inter-

city.
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imposed according to the provisions of section 20317 of the Act which
require deductions from old-age benefits if wages in excess of $125
per month' s are received for services performed by the beneficiary.
Section 2g9 then defines wages as "remuneration . . . for employ-

ment."' 9 Thus the definition of employment in section 21o(a)20 of the
Social Security Act (the language being substantially the same as that
in section 3 121(b) of FICA) was at issue. Travis contended that since
less than half of his service for a Canadian firm was performed in
Oklahoma, and more than half in Canada, section 21o(b) 21 of the Act
(the language being identical to that in section 312 1(c)) required that
none of his services in Oklahoma be deemed employment when deter22
mining his monthly wages from employment services.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held
,that section 21o(b) did not preclude a consideration of services performed in Oklahoma when determining benefit deductions since
"Travis performed no service which could be classified as one of the
nineteen 'excluded' services." 23 The court further concluded that the
language of section 2io(b), entitled "Included and excluded service,"
when read in its proper context within the Social Security Act and
considered in light of ,the legislative purpose of the section, "applies
only where an employee performs, for the same employer, both an included and an excluded service within the meaning of Section 21o(a)."2 4
The judicial interpretation of the statutory language in FICA section 3121(c) finds support in a 1940 opinion rendered by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue. 25 A foreign airline operating between foreign
742 U.S.C. §§ 403(b), (c), () (1964), as amended, (Supp. II 1965-66).
'42 U.S.C. § 403(f)(1)(D) (Supp. II 1965-66). The minimum monthly wage is
now $140. 42 U.S.C. § 4o3 (f)(1)(D) (Supp. IV 1965-68).
"42 U.S.C. § 409 (1964), as amended, (Supp. II 1965-66). This is the same
definition given 'to wages under FICA. INT. RaV. CODE Of 1954, § 3121(a).
2'4 2 U.S.C. § 41o(a) (1964), as amended, (Supp. II 1965-66).
142 U.S.C. § 41o(b) (1964), as amended, (Supp. II 1965-66).
2
Gardner v. Travis, 387 F.2d 5o8, 512 (loth Cir. 1967). Travis was employed
as a management consultant by a Canadian firm at a monthly salary of $6oo. He
resided in Oklahoma and made about six trips a year to Canada, each lasting
for a period of ten to sixteen days. Between trips, only about 5% of his research
time was devoted to studying material directly related to his Canadian employer.
Id. at 51o-11.
mId. at 513. According to the court of appeals, however, even if a service did
not fall within the section 21o(a) definition of employment, section 203 (f)( 5)(C)
requires that any wages so received for the performance of services within the
United States he considered when determining whether benefit deductions are
warranted. Id. at 513. FICA has no similar provision.
'Id. at 512 (emphasis added).
2
S.S.T. 402, 1940-2 Cumr. Bu.. 252.
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and United States airports sought a ruling with respect to whether its
flight personnel were wholly taxable or wholly exempt under section
1426(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 193926 (the predecessor of
FICA section 3121(c)). The Bureau was of the opinion that section
1426(c) was not intended to include or exclude service as taxable employment on the basis of 'the quantity of service performed within
the United States in relation to the total amount of services performed
27
both within and without the United States.
It is questionable whether this position taken with regard to airlines in 1940 should be respected as a contemporaneous construction
of the statute when applied to highway carriers in 1961.28 Services
performed by foreign citizen employees on or in connection with a
foreign aircraft or vessel have since been specifically excluded from
being considered employment under FIGA.2 9 However, the opinion of
the Bureau is consistent with the applicable Treasury Regulation on
the matter.30 In addition, it is generally held that expressions of opinion by the Treasury Department in defining terms in the tax field,
when substantially contemporaneous with the enactment of a tax
statute, are "highly relevant and material evidence of the probable
general understanding of the times and of the opinions of men who
probably were active in the drafting of the statute." 31 Although such innSocial

Security Act Amendments of 1939, ch. 666, § 606, 53 Stat. 1386.
-. S.T. 402, 1940-2 Cull. Buu.. 252, 253.
2Inter-City Truck Lines, Ltd. v. United States, 4o8 F.2d 686, 689 (Ct. Cl. x969)
(dissenting opinion). The majority in the instant case referred to the Bureau's
opinion as a contemporaneous construction. Id. at 688.
23INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 3 121(b)( 4 ). The exclusionary language is as follows:
(4) service performed by an individual on or in connection with a vessel not an American vessel, or on or in connection with an aircraft not an
American aircraft, if (A) the individual is employed on and in connection
with such vessel or aircraft, when outside the United States and (B) (i)
such individual is not a citizen of the United States or (ii) the employer
is not an American employer....
lnTreas. Reg. § 3 1.3 121(b)-3 (1970). The Regulation reads in part as follows:
(b)"Services performed within the United States."
Services performed after 1954 within the United States ...by an employee
for his employer, unless specifically excepted by section 312i(b), constitute
employment ....
The citizenship or residence of the employee or of the
employer also isimmaterial except to the extent provided in any specific
exception from employment. Thus, the employee and the employer may
be citizens and residents a foreign country and the contract of service may
be entered into in a foreign county, and yet, if the employee under such
contract performs services within the United States, there may be to that
extent employment (emphasis added).
mWhite v. Winchester Country Club, 315 U.S. 32, 41 (1942); see Better Business
Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279 (1945).
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2
,terpretative opinions and regulations are not binding on the courtsa it
has been held that they "should not be overruled except for weighty
reasons." 33
The probable legislative intent of the language used in section
3121(c) of FICA is also a pertinent consideration in any judicial attempt to clarify its ambiguity. The court of claims in Inter-City cities
Senate Report No. 724 accompanying the 1939 amendments to the
Social Security Act as determinative of the intent of Congress with
respect to the meaning of "Included and excluded services." That Report reads:

8. Included and excluded services. - The law is changed with
respect to services of an employee performing both included
and excluded employment for the same employer so that the
services which predominate in a pay period
determine his
34
status with that employer for that period.
The court of appeals in Travis supports its decision by citing the
House Report which is substantially identical.35 It is difficult to see,
however, that this language, on its face, makes it "inescapably clear" 36
that Congress intended the term "excluded service," as used in FICA
section 3121(c), to refer only to the nineteen exceptions contained in
section 3 121(b). To so conclude still would require, a priori, that "excluded services" refer only to the nineteen exceptions, since the congressional reports, like the section 3121(c) language itself, make no
statement that "excluded service" is limited to the specific exceptions
in section 3 121(b).3X
2Schwing v. United States, 65 F. Supp. 227, 229-30 (E.D. Pa. 1946), rev'd on
other grounds, 165 F.2d 518 (3d Cir. 1948); Hirsch v. Rothensies. 56 F. Supp.
92, 96 (E)D. Pa. 1944). An administrative regulation is binding on the courts, however, when issued pursuant -to a valid congressional grant of legislative power to
the administrative agency. See, e.g., Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Accardi,
349 U.S. 28o (1955); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 252 (1936).
"Inter-City Truck Lines, Ltd. v. United States, 408 F.2d 686, 688 (Ct. Cl.
1969); accord, Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948);
see White v. Winchester Country Club, 315 U.S. 32 (1942); Nicholas v. Richlow
Mfg. Co., 126 F.2d 16 (1oth Cir. 1941); U.S. Thermo Control Co. v. United States,
372 F.2d 964 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 839 (1967).
However, even the "weighty reasons" test could not permit a construction of
statutory words and phrases to be given unusual or strained meanings unjustified
by legislative intent. Better Business Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283
(1945).
3S. RP,. No. 734, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1939).

"187 F.2d at 512; H.R. REP. No. 728, 76th Cong., ist Sess. 18 (1939).
"387 F.2d 508, 512 (1Oth Cir. 1967).
37The testimony of A. J. Altmeyer, Chairman of the Social Security Board in
1939, gives greater insight into the intention which the House and Senate inadequately expressed in their respective reports. Altmeyer testified in hearings
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It is important to note that FICA is one of the taxing devices38s
by which funds are acquired for disposition as benefits under the provisions of the Social Security Act. 39 Thus the construction of the statutory language in question should be considered in light of the broad
before the House Committee on Ways and Means relative to the Social Security
Act Amendments of 1939:
Mr. ALTMiEYER.
Then we are suggesting the clarification of the law regarding the
services of employees who perform both excluded and included employment, the suggestion being that the major portion of his time shall
determine whether all of his time shall be considered as having been
devoted to excluded or included employment. You do get some cases where
an employee divides his time between excluded and included employment.
The present law is silent, and that makes it difficult for the Treasury
and for the Board to determine these cases, which are not large in number,
but, nevertheless, should be cleared up, if some slight amendment may
do so.
Mr. CooPER [Representative from Tennessee]. Will you give us an illustration of the type of case you have in mind?
Mr. ALTnEYER. The instances that occur to me are these border-line cases
between agricultural and nonagricultural employment. For instance, a
man works in a greenhouse and greenhouse work is held to be agricultural
employment now. If that fellow comes into town and does some work
for the employer not connected with the greenhouse, perhaps delivering
flowers from the retail flower store, he would be in "included employment." The question is, does the employer have to split up his time, or
how shall that sort of case be handled?
Mr. COOPER. Well, now, do you have in mind a man working for an
employer, who is engaged in more than one line of business?
Mr. ALT'rEYER. Yes, sir; that is where he works for the same employer,
but works in two different lines, two different occupations.
Mr. COOPER. Two different kinds of work?
MR. ALTMEYER. Yes.

Mr. CooPR. That would not have any relation, then, to -the man who
worked on the farm, and after the crops were laid by, then he went to work
for a sawmill for awhile.
Mr. ALTMEYER. No, sir.
Mr. COOPER. That would not have any connection with him?
Mr. ALTMEYER. No, sir. It is just my suggestion that there be laid down
in the law a rough, mathematical statement, so that employers who are
engaged partly in an excluded and partly in an included occupation may
have a standard by which to report on these employees.
Mr. COOPER. And that would only relate to the employer who used the
employee for two or more different types of work?
Mr. ALTAmYma. Yes, sir.
Hearings Relative to the 6ocial Security Act Amendments of z939 Before the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 7 6th Cong., ist Sess. 2288-89 (1939).
3Other employment tax acts that operate to provide funds for social security
benefit payments are the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, INT. REV. CODE of
1954, §§ 33OI-09, and the Railroad Retirement Tax Act, INT. REv. CODE of 1954,
§ 3201-33.
342 U.S.C. §§ 301-1394 (1964), as amended, (Supp. IV 1965-68).
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purpose of the Social Security Act. The intent of Congress in passing
the Act was to promote the general welfare by providing, through
taxation, a fund for the needy worker.40 The taxing phases of the Act
have been held to be "secondary and incidental." 4' In furtherance of
the Act's remedial purpose it has been held that doubtful questions
should be resolved in favor of employment where the right to social
security benefits is concerned. 4 2 However, it is doubtful that the Canadian employees paying taxes under FICA in the present case could
qualify for social security benefits. The Social Security Act suspends
the payment of benefits to an employee who is a foreign citizen if he
stays outside the United States for over six months, unless he has ten
years of covered service. 43 Thus it is possible that a Canadian employee
paying FICA taxes could not enjoy any of the benefits received by
United States residents paying similar taxes unless he continued to
perform services withiA the United States for his Canadian employer
44
according to the statutory criteria.
Any interpretation of employment as defined in FICA depends on
the scope of "Included and excluded service" as used in the title of
section 3121(c). Section

3 121(b)

sets out the three categories of service

10Hearst Publ., Inc. v. United States, 7o F. Supp. 666, 670 (N.D. Cal. 1946), afJ'd,
168 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1948). See generally Reynolds v. Northern Pac. Ry., 168
F.2d 984 (8th Cir. 1948); United States v. Vogue, Inc., 145 F.2d 6o9 (4th Cir.
1944). It has been held that the payments of disability benefits under the Act are
designed to go to those workers who contributed to this nation's labor force.
Coleman v. Gardner, 264 F. Supp. 714, 718 (S.D.W.Va. 1967).
4-Grace v. Magruder, 148 F.2d 679, 68o (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 720
(1945).
-"TexasCarbonate Co. v. Phinney, 37 F.2d 289 (sth Cir.), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 940 (1962); Westover v. Stockholders Pub. Co., 237 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1956);
Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Higgins, 189 F.2d 865
(2d Cir. 1951); Hearst Publ., Inc. v. United States, 70 F. Supp. 666 (N.D. Cal. 1946),
aff'd, 168 F.2d 751 (gth Cir. 1948).
4§ 202(t), 42 U.S.C. § 402(t) (1964), as amended, (Supp. IV 1965-68).
"The dissenting judge in Inter-City argued that the Canadian drivers could
not qualify for benefits "unless the Canadian employer persisted in using them
repeatedly on international trips to his own financial detriment." 408 F.2d at
689. However, this consideration is weakened by the holding that, barring arbitrary
governmental action, a person only has a right to social security benefits to the
extent that such right is supported by provisions of the social security statutes.
Price v. Folsom, 168 F. Supp. 392 (D.N.J. 1958), aff'd, 28o F.2d 956 (3d Cir. ig6o) ,
cert. denied, 365 U.S. 817 (1961). It has also been held that the taxing provisions
of the Social Security Act do not unfairly deny benefits simply because they exempt
certain classes of American employers and employees from their benefits and
burdens. See Helvering v. Davis, 3o U.S. 619 (1937); Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis,
301 U.S. 548 (1937); Carmichael v. Southern Coal S. Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495 (1937);
W.H.H. Chamberlin, Inc. v. Andrews, 271 N.Y. 1, 2 N.E.2d 22, aff'd without
opinion by an equally divided Court, 299 U.S. 515 (1986).
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to be considered: (i) services which do not come within the section's
definition of employment; 45 (2) services which do come within the
definition of employment, 46 and (3) services which fall within -thedefinition of "employment" but are specifically excluded from being
considered as such.4 7 The court of claims in Inter-City takes the position that section 3121(c) is used only to determine what is employment
when the employee has performed services for this employer which
fall partly in category (2) and partly in category (8) above. The taxpayer contended that all service which is not included within the subsection (b) definition of employment must, therefore, be "excluded
service." By this interpretation, if the portion of services in category
(i) predominate, section 3121(c) would have the effect of placing the
services in (2) in the same category as those in (i), and none of them
could be taxed under FICA.
To adopt the taxpayer's interpretation of employment would lead,
nonetheless, to an expansion of the scope of FICA not contemplated
by Congress. It must be considered that the taxpayer's interpretation
of section 312 1(c) excludes from the employment tax all wages paid for
services performed both within and without the United States only
if less than half of the total services are performed within the United
States. The obverse of this argument is equally significant. If the predominance of services performed outside the United States exempts
wages paid for all services, a predominance of services within the
United States could result in taxing wages paid for servcies performed
outside the United States. Accordingly, a Canadian employer could
be required to pay FICA taxes on the entire wages of a Canadian employee, although as much as 49 percent of the employee's services may
have been performed in Canada and the wages paid in Canada. 48 To
assert the FICA tax on the Canadian service, however, would require
the United States to extend its present taxing jurisdiction to wages
paid by a foreign employer to a foreign citizen for services performed
outside the United States. Such taxation would be contrary to the express limitation in section 3121(b) that service performed outside the
United States is taxable only if performed by a United States citizen
'MThis category would encompass all services not performed within the United
States except those performed by a United States citizen for his American employer.
INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 8121(b).
1'INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 3121(b)(A)-(B).
' 7INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 3121(b)(1)-(1g).
'"Brief for Defendant at 11-12, Inter-City Truck Lines, Ltd. v. United States,
408 F.2d 686 (Ct. Cl. 1969). This very persuasive reasoning is only alluded to in the
majority's opinion in Inter-City. 408 F.2d at 688,
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for an American employer. 49 Conversely, the interpretation of the
court of claims would not require an extension of FICA jurisdiction
in this situation since only the amount of service performed within
the United States, regardless of the percentage of such service to the
total service in a pay period, would be taxable. Thus the taxpayer's
interpretation of the statutory language at issue, while reasonably
within the letter of the statute, is plainly not within its spirit, and not
within the intention of the legislature.50
The view of the dissenting judge in Inter-City is that international
highway carriers might have acquired a "customary exemption"' '
from FICA taxation altogether, and to tax them now would result in
double taxation. 52 Yet if the Canadian corporation did not have to
pay FICA taxes on any of the wages earned by its employees for services performed within the United States, it would gain an economic
advantage over an American employer engaged in the same occupation:
Such a corporation could effectively eliminate competitors,
actual and potential, since it could undersell corporations,
4

0INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 3 12i(b); text accompanying note 3 supra.
nInter-City Truck Lines, Ltd. v. United States, 408 F.2d 686, 688-89 (Ct. Cl.
1969). It is a recognized rule of statutory construction that a court should interpret
a statute so as not to distort the intention of its makers. See Church of the Holy
Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892); Select Tire Salvage Co. v. United
States, 386 F.2d ioo8 (Ct. Cl. 1967). The taxpayer's interpretation could also work
an injustice upon a Canadian employee who performed a minority of his employment within the United States. If the employee performed such service according
to the requirements of section 2o2(t) of the Social Security Act [42 U.S.C. § 4o2(t)
(1964), as amended, (Supp. IV 1965-68)), he could still be denied its benefits since
no tax would be collected on the service. Text accompanying note 43 supra.
na4o 8 F.2d at 689. The dissent analogizes certain "customary exemptions" from
duties under 'the customs laws to the situation in the present case and states:
I would like to be shown that Canadian highway carriers did not obtain,
for .trips between Canadian and United States points, after -the enactment
of the Social Security Act and before 1961 a "customary exemption" of
equal validity.
Id.,; see The Conqueror, 166 U.S. 11o (1897); 19 U.S.C. § 1322(a) (1964).
This position seems contrary to other cases arising under FICA which have
held that the Government would not be estopped from subsequently denying
exemption to a particular occupation although it had earlier permitted it an
exemption from taxation. See, e.g., United States v. La Societe Francaise De Bienfaisance Mutuelle, 152 F.2d 243 (9th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 327 U.S. 793 (1946);
S.S. Kresge Co. v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. Mich. 1963); Williams
Packing & Navigation Co. v. Enochs, 176 F. Supp. 168 (S.D. Miss. 1959), aff'd,
291 F.2d 402 (5 th Cir. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 370 U-S. 1 (1962).
52It has been held that the provisions relating to exemption set forth in United
States-Canada Income Tax Convention, Nov. 21, 1951, 1955-1 Cut. BULL. 624,
do not include exemption -from FICA taxation. Rev. Rul. 56-6o9, 956-2 Cum. BULL.
io66. See S. ROBERTS & W. WARREN, U.S. INCOME TAXATION OF FOREIGN CORPORATION AND NONRESIDENT ALIENS IX/8A (1968).
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whose earnings are subject to dimunition (sic) by federal taxation. It is difficult to believe that Congress intended to counten3
ance such a situation.5
In addition, double taxation54 could occur whether the broad or
narrow interpretation of employment was approved by the court of
claims. Since the taxpayer's interpretation would permit FICA taxation on all employment if a majority of an employee's services were
performed within the United States, at least the minority service performed in Canada would presumably be taxed under the Canadian
social security system. 55
It would appear that the Inter-City interpretation of the statutory language of sections 3 i2i(b) and 3121(c) is most consistent with
the intent of Congress and the broad purpose of social security legislation. However, the plaintiff taxpayer's assertion is not unreasonable
due to the absence of specific reference in subsection (c) to the nineOUnited States v. Community Services, Inc., 189 F.2d 421, 425 (4th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 342 US. 932 (1952).
"'The dissenting judge in Inter-City uses the term "double taxation" to infer
the objectionable or prohibited practice of taxing the same subject matter twice
when it should be taxed only once. However, it is often said that to constitute
double taxation in this sense, both taxes must be imposed on the same subject
matter, for the same purpose, and by the same government or taxing authority.
E.g., Estate of Good v. Good, 28 Cal. Rptr. 378 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Fox v. Board
For Louisville & Jefferson County Children's Home, 244 Ky. 1, 50 S.W.2d 67
(1932); C.F. Smith Co. v. Fitzgerald, 270 Mich. 659, 259 N.W. 352, appeal dismissed
sub nom. C.F. Smith Co. v. Atwood, 296 U.S. 659 (1935); Allegheny County Motor
Co. v. City of Pittsburgh, 36o Pa. 407, 62 A.2d 64 (1948). By this view, no prohibitive
double taxation occurs since the taxes are imposed by two different governments.
'Canada has numerous Acts which compromise its social security system,
each with different taxing provisions, rates, and qualifications for benefits. See, e.g.,
Canada Pension Plan, c. 51 (1965); Old Age Security Act, CAN. REv. STAT. c. 2oo
(1952), as amended; Old Age Assistance Act, CAN. REV. STAT. c. 199 (1952), as
amended. However, since none of the Canadian social security acts is exactly comparable to FICA, the difficulty would lie in determining under which act(s)
duplicate taxation occurs. It is possible that there would be no duplication since
certain of the Canadian social security acts contain flexible provisions which would
permit the agency charged with administration of an act to prevent double
taxation on Canadian taxpayers. For example, the Unemployment Insurance Act
provides:
The Commission may ... make regulations for excepting from insurable employment
(a) any employment if it appears to the Commission that by reason of
the laws of any country other than Canada a duplication of contributions or benefits will result;
(d) the entire employment of a person who is engaged under one employer partly in insurable employment and partly in other employment ....
Unemployment Insurance Act, 3-4 Eliz. II, c. 50, § 28(1), at 3o5 (Can. 1955).

